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SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPS

Australia and New Zealand in the Anglo-American World¹

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In this chapter, we argue that the extensive range of Australia's and New Zealand's (NZ) foreign policy activities – including their involvement in numerous foreign wars since the Boer War – can be best explained by the special relations both nations have maintained with the broader Anglo-American world. Strong bonds of shared interests, history, culture, and other commonalities have proven durable and demonstrably influential in determining the priorities and actions of both Antipodean countries. The “imagined community” of the Anglo-American world, strengthened by regular economic, military, and diplomatic interactions, possesses significant ideational power. Such bonds have also been affected by emotional beliefs, as Mercer puts it, “a generalization about an actor that involves certainty beyond evidence.”² These beliefs are expressed either as positive sentiments towards fellow members of the Anglo-American world, or as distrust of “others” like Japan, Indonesia, or China.

The origin and nature of these emotional and ideational ties are key foci of our chapter. Arguably, European settlement of both countries has had a long-term impact, orienting both nations towards Britain, the USA, and other white settler societies (and to a lesser extent non-white British colonies and ex-British colonies) for most of their histories. The resulting strategic culture helps to explain the extremely close security and cultural alliances with the USA and Britain, which we will dissect in detail. Both of our case studies are clearly part of the “West,” even if that West, to echo Peter Katzenstein, is a plural and pluralist entity, often difficult to define as it is evolving and changing.³

Throughout this chapter, we find the distinctions between functionalist and sentimental special relationships helpful for our analysis. This distinction allows us to highlight different aspects of the relations both countries maintain, at elite and popular levels. As we demonstrate, Australia's and NZ's relationship with the United Kingdom (UK) began as both functionalist and sentimental. The relationship is

now primarily sentimentalist for both nations, although NZ maintains more sentimental ties than does Australia. The US relationship for both countries has been primarily functionalist, although in Australia it was imbued with significant sentimentalism during the Howard–Bush period. Both functionalist and sentimentalist elements inform the relationship between the Antipodean nations themselves. However, we also critique artificial divisions between these two distinctions, since identities and interests are often tightly bound together and in practice nearly impossible to separate. The best that can be said, then, is that functionalism and sentimentalism exist as two ideal types, with actors within the state expressing tendencies toward one more than the other.

We also take into consideration the complex interdependent relationships between NZ and Australia and other members of the Anglo–American world. As Keohane and Nye observed some time ago,⁴ multiple channels connect societies; elite contacts are not all that count. In both cases, special relations occur between different segments of the population at different times. We draw distinctions between the national security apparatus – the political and business elites, and the general population. Migdal provides a useful means of drawing distinctions between the permanent or national security state and the general population or society. Going further than Max Weber, he argues that “The state is a field of power marked by the use and threat of violence and shaped by (1) the image of a coherent, controlling organization in a territory, which is a representation of the people bounded by that territory, and (2) the actual practices of its multiple parts.”⁵ Bearing this in mind, when dealing with special relationships we ask: “special for whom?” However, it falls beyond the ambit of this chapter to actively track public versus elite desires, attitudes, and policy preferences and their periods of convergence and divergence.

Our chapter proceeds as follows: in the first section, we present a theoretical overview of special relationships and alliance building, establishing a framework which we then apply to our case studies. In this section, we also engage briefly with the emerging literature on emotions in international relations. In the second, we highlight the importance of security in both Australia’s and NZ’s special relationships, with subsections on the UK and the USA. We follow this with a subsection on NZ’s break with the ANZUS alliance, another evaluating the significance of NZ’s foreign policy turn, and a third on the role of Australian public opinion in foreign policy. We conclude this section by examining the prospects for security convergence between both countries and the USA. In the third section, we offer a brief focus on economic relations (UK, USA, but also Asia). The final section concludes our analysis with a look at Australia’s and NZ’s bilateral relationships.

Special relationships and alliance building

Martin Wight provides a useful definition of what is assumed to make a special relationship: “associations between powers that seem to be deeper than formal alliances, to be based on affinity and tradition as much as interest.”⁶ Bow and

Santa-Cruz further define special relationships in their work on Mexican and Canadian relationships with the USA, listing features such as “mutual understanding, extensive and often informal policy coordination, and reflexive self-restraint under stress.” Here, shared interests, as well as “a deeply-rooted sense of mutual identification and common purposes,” play crucial roles.⁷ In these definitions, there are different levels of analysis. Wight writes about governments, but also about affinities between populations. Bow and Santa-Cruz are more concerned with high-level contact between bureaucrats, military leaders, and politicians. In our case studies, we explore a range of relationships.

Measuring the “specialness” of a relationship between countries is not easy. It is even more difficult in the case of America, with whom so many nations are said to have a special relationship. As David Schoenbaum has written, the term has been applied to US relations with “Canada, Mexico, and Panama, Britain, France, and Germany, the Soviet Union and the Russia that reemerged from its ruins, at least one Korea, one Vietnam, and two Chinas, Cuba, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador.”⁸ As we outline later, the standard-bearer remains the Anglo-American special relationship.

Specialness does not tell us much about the relative capabilities of those in the relationship. It may infer equality among similar peoples (a “band of brothers”), but it can also imply hierarchical relationships between imperial powers and colonial administrations. The term thus evokes comparisons to relationships between parent-child, husband-wife, siblings, or cousins, provoking a range of emotions such as “loyalty and betrayal, agony and ecstasy, and yearning and spurning.”⁹ Measuring why a “relationship” is special comes down to identifying which of the many factors in a special relationship are potentially the most important, be they cultural, military, economic, racial, religious, or linguistic. The question “special for whom?” alerts us to the fact that while a free trade deal may be special for business elites, or NATO special for military elites, neither may resonate with the general population.

Further, “special” does not imply “identical.” Even in the UK-US relationship, similar values are offset by differences in geography, capabilities, and communications. The classic image of the Anglo-American relationship is of a series of concentric circles, with Britain located within the Commonwealth, Europe, and an imagined North Atlantic community. The UK operates as a “swing power” in John Dumbrell’s phraseology, wielding power “as a fulcrum within a wheel.”¹⁰ Bridge imagery also played an important role in this relationship during Tony Blair’s administration, as he signaled the UK’s unique ability to act as intermediary between Europe and the USA. UK foreign policy was oriented towards striking the right balance, allowing one side to cross to the other bank, and back. The UK thus figured as a sort of glue that bound the two halves of the West together, albeit at an elite level.¹¹

In Table 8.1, we have measured the state-centered special relations in the Anglo-American world by comparing eight key elements. This process helps illustrate the overall strength or weakness of each relationship, rather than focusing

TABLE 8.1 State special relations in the Anglo-American world

Country	Former colony	Trade	Military training	Intelligence sharing	Legal system	Wartime alliance	Political system	Proximity to either UK or USA
Canada	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y*	Y	Y	Y
NZ	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
Australia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
USA	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
UK	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mexico	N**	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y
China	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N

Notes

* Quebec continues its civil law tradition while the rest of Canada is common law.

** Much of Mexican territory was incorporated into the USA in the nineteenth century.

on one strong aspect. For example, an emphasis on trade would make China appear to have a very strong special relationship with Australia and NZ. Yet China shares few significant commonalities in other areas, such as geographic proximity, system of government, legal system, and sharing of military equipment or intelligence. Conversely, while much further away from Australia and NZ, the USA, UK, and Canada have far more in common with them.

In Table 8.2 we focus on societal commonalities such as culture, ethnicity, language, religion, and other variables. These help isolate further similarities and differences. In both tables we include “wartime alliances,” which refers to alliance building during the twentieth century and after. We argue that wars connect elites and society and have played a formative role in special relationship building. We have also included a colonial/imperial dimension since, for our cases, these shared histories and ties continue to be very important.

Functionalist and sentimentalist approaches to special relationships

What role do special relationships serve in a country’s foreign policy and identity? The answer depends on whether you take a “functionalist” or a “sentimentalist” viewpoint, although in practice, as we have noted, this is largely a chicken and egg debate. In Danchev’s “functionalist” interpretation, realism of either the classical or structural variety plays a key role: shared interests lead to negotiated compromise. Friction often surfaces in the relationship because it is not based on emotions or

TABLE 8.2 *Social special relations in the Anglo-American world*

<i>Country</i>	<i>Culture</i>	<i>Ethnicity</i>	<i>Language</i>	<i>Religion</i>	<i>Wartime alliance</i>	<i>Shared empire UK</i>
Canada	Y	Y*	Y*	Y	Y	Y
NZ	Y	Y*	Y*	Y	Y	Y
Australia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
USA	Y	Y*	Y	Y	Y	Y**
UK	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mexico	N	N*	N	Y	N	N
China	N	N	N	N	N	N

Notes

* We have asterisked some of the countries in Ethnicity and Language because of large French-speaking populations in Canada, indigenous Māori in NZ, and European settlers in Mexico.

** Until the eighteenth century.

shared culture, or even on a shared worldview. Rather, the relationship is practical and seeks to avoid reliance on mythology about shared culture, language, or, perhaps at a subtextual level, race.¹² Table 8.1 illustrates how these special relations at the elite level converge and diverge, together with economic, military, judicial, and other institutional arrangements. Why does such mythology exist? This is where Table 8.2 enters the analysis. Danchev submits that imagery of shared values is often ritualistic and liturgical without always having much substantive content. Like many cliché-ridden rituals, the language can be superficial, as it attempts to paper over complex and contradictory histories. As Danchev puts it, the Anglo-American special relationship “has formidable assets, some of them well hidden. One of the greatest is the stories it tells to sustain itself. The real strength of shared values is in the soul of historiography. The truth lies somewhere between monumentalized past and mythical fiction.”¹³

Generally, politicians rather than scholars have talked up the Anglo-American special relationship, as evidenced by its origin in Winston Churchill’s famous 1946 speech. David Watt notes the common trend for British prime ministers to routinely invoke “‘our joint aims,’ ‘our common heritage,’ and other emblems of ‘the unity of the English-speaking peoples’” to give such clichés “the patina of great antiquity.”¹⁴ Official rhetoric has explained the rationale behind the closeness in terms of common language, heritage, and history, as demonstrated in Table 8.2. Many scholars, on the other hand, argue that common interests rather than shared values sustained UK–US relations throughout the twentieth century, and thus would see the specialness of the relationship primarily through the characteristics listed in Table 8.1. Thus, the alliance between the two nations appeared in moments

of necessity, such as the shared threat of the Nazis and the Soviets.¹⁵ It follows that contemporary scholars such as David Reynolds view the “special relationship” as largely a British diplomatic strategy to cope with and benefit from American power.¹⁶

However, we are still left with the question of why clichés and shared values provide public traction when rallying populations to support certain policies and countries. In contrast to Danchev, Dumbrell has proposed that sentiments *do* matter, and that the Anglo-American special relationship has largely been based on beliefs about shared kinship, culture, symbols, and values that people actually believe are important.¹⁷ The argument is then that the general population finds these ties compelling and, to a certain extent, so do elites. Recent proponents of this argument include Niall Ferguson, Andrew Roberts, and Walter Russell Mead, all of whom see the Anglo-American world as a sentimentalist and functionalist project, with shared culture, language, values, legal, political, and philosophical principles as the core drivers of Anglo-American unity.¹⁸

We are presented with two overarching claims. The functionalist perspective posits that politicians pay rhetorical lip service to well-worn phrases about “the English speaking peoples,” without believing in such rhetoric themselves – although there is the assumption that the populace feels these attachments are meaningful. Shared values and moral causes are plot devices used by politicians to sell wars and interventions abroad to populations who find emotional resonance with such claims. McDermott describes this process as the “calculated use of emotional entrepreneurship by leaders to create and craft particular kinds of political identity.”¹⁹ Sentimentalists, on the other hand, emphasize the importance of commonalities derived from shared racial, ethnic, linguistic, cultural, or historical attributes. For them, these shared attributes and the norms that arise from them makes cooperation naturally easier between Anglo-American states.²⁰ Thus both elites and the general population are included in these ties. We see a clear example of this merging of sentimentalism and functionalism in the Obama–Cameron summit in May 2011. Here the president and prime minister released a joint statement, which proclaimed of the US–UK special relationship that,

Yes, it is founded on a deep emotional connection, by sentiment and ties of people and culture. But the reason it thrives, the reason why this is such a natural partnership, is because it advances our common interests and shared values. It is a perfect alignment of what we both need and what we both believe. And the reason it remains strong is because it delivers time and again. Ours is not just a special relationship, it is an essential relationship – for us and for the world.²¹

This merging of the two forms of special relationship, we suggest, also echoes the idea of “International Society” introduced by the English School. Hedley Bull

and Adam Watson's classic definition describes well the broad outlines of the Anglo-American world:

a group of states (or, more generally, a group of independent political communities) which not merely form a system, in the sense that the behavior of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others, but also have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognize their common interest in maintaining these arrangements.²²

The focus on "solidarism" by some English School theorists like Nick Wheeler works well towards explaining why black-letter legal sovereignty amongst members of the Anglo-American world seems less important than cooperation across a range of issue areas.²³

Our chapter moves away from a strict dichotomy between functionalism and sentimentalism. Such a dichotomy is artificial, we argue, since it is virtually impossible to draw a dividing line between these forms of "specialness." Foreign policy decisions can be explained by both theories, to varying degrees, and at varying times. In the cases of NZ and Australia, sentimental rhetoric has often been used to achieve functionalist aims, while at the same time, polling data and anecdotal information make it clear that sentimental ties are very important for voters and decision-makers.²⁴ In both Australia and NZ, as well as in Canada, political leaders chose to reject full sovereignty. All three cases were marked by slowly evolving gray periods in which a series of acts (the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840, the British North America Act of 1867, and the Australian Constitution in 1901) seemed to give sovereignty in a sense; but it took a very long time to achieve. In Canada, for example, it only came with the Constitution Act in 1982.²⁵ The specialness of these relationships defies the normal black-box model of sovereign states. Since the nature of sovereignty differs considerably among these cases, so does the specialness of their relations with the UK, the USA, and each other.

Specialness for us also connotes the role of emotions in alliance politics. Sentimentalism in special relations implies a certain level of emotional attachment to certain countries and peoples, as well as repulsion from others. Mercer, Ross, and Crawford, amongst others, have argued that emotional beliefs can help cement alliances and promote cooperation, or can lead to inexplicably high levels of mistrust. Mercer, for example, has argued that emotions influence decision-making behavior both positively and negatively: "A preexisting feeling that a relationship is warm, or one that is characterized by empathetic understanding with the other, may help actors frame ambiguous behavior as neutral, positive, or motivated by circumstances rather than hostile intentions." "Conversely," he argues, "fear and antipathy may promote negative evaluations and make a neutral or positive reception of ambiguous behaviors and events less likely."²⁶ Ross adds to this that "empathy develops, exchanges are more effective, parties are more open to a range of options that speak to each party's interests, and viable agreements become more

attractive to all.” Summing up, Crawford notes that emotions act to “influence actors’ understanding of the past and sense of what is possible in the future in four ways; emotions influence recall, the use of analogy, the evaluation of past choices, and the consideration of counterfactuals.”²⁷

Australia and NZ demonstrate in their respective histories how both affinity and distaste played important roles in alliance building. Affinity with fellow members of the Anglo-American club helped cement strong relations over and above any purely rational considerations, while fear of Asian countries, such as China and Japan, played a key role in the formation of Australia and NZ and helped create domestic identity, while shaping foreign policy attitudes. Yet while we can trace the military, economic, political, and diplomatic effects of emotional attachments, emotional beliefs are not always obvious, and can sometimes be impervious to study based on traditional social scientific methods. Reflecting Bleiker and Hutchison, we argue that in examining special relations we may need to “accept that research can be insightful and valid even if it engages unobservable phenomena, and even if the results of such inquiries can neither be measured nor validated empirically.”²⁸

Security relationships in Australia and New Zealand

In this section, we begin by highlighting some of the salient similarities and differences between Australia and NZ in their relationships to the UK and the USA from the nineteenth century through to the 1970s. This includes pro-British sentiments, Asia-skepticism, mutual attraction between the two countries, and ties to the rest of the Anglo-American world. The 1970s saw the UK enter the European Economic Community (EEC) and “push” NZ and Australia away, prompting the two Antipodean nations to engage more strongly with Asia. With regard to the USA, there are similarities but also divergence during the 1980s when NZ, for domestic political reasons (as well as party politics), instigated a partial break from the USA, pursuing (at least on the surface) its own foreign policy course. Overall, a recurring theme plays out in Australia–NZ relations: NZ feels it has a less vulnerable geographical position, which has allowed it the “luxury” of looser relations with the USA and a smaller defense budget. Consequently, in 2007, NZ’s per capita defense spending was 1.1 percent of GDP, mirroring Canada’s. In contrast, Australia sat at 1.9 percent and the USA at 4.0 percent.²⁹

The British era

The nineteenth-century security environment was marked not only by external challenges (with Asia as a common “Other” that helped glue the colonies together), but internal ones as well. The empire was crucial in securing the rights and privileges of settlers in its Antipodean colonies. Special relationships, expressed in ethnic terms, were secured by military force. The colonists saw themselves as British and expected British protection, but reciprocally expressed great willingness to defend the empire in which they had common cause, not just in the Asia-Pacific but

around the world, as Audie Klotz has noted in Chapter 4 in this volume. Ties were not just functional but strongly driven by sentiments as well. Different interpretations of the British relationship may be in part influenced by NZ's large Anglo-Saxon population (primarily English and Scottish), which still predominate today. By contrast, Australia had a larger proportion of Irish immigrants – 30 percent versus 20 percent in NZ. Roughly 80 percent of New Zealanders have some British ancestry, and an estimated 17 percent have the right to a British passport.³⁰

While Australia was initially a penal colony in the eighteenth century and only later became a destination for settlers, NZ began in the nineteenth century as a planned settler colony. Edward Gibbon Wakefield, an architect of NZ's colonization, aimed, as he put it, to replicate “an entire British community” that would include such elements as “the manners, the institutions, the religion, the private and the public character” of the country they left behind.³¹ The process of settlement continued well into the mid-twentieth century. Both Australia and NZ instigated passage schemes to encourage British immigration during the 1940s and 1950s in an effort to “maintain the Britishness.”³² Ethnicity and the British special relationship went hand in hand because, until at least the 1970s, most white New Zealanders saw themselves as British and saw Britain as their homeland. The same held true for Australia, although for a smaller percentage of the population.

NZ and Australian politicians avoided strident quests for independence during the nineteenth century and even late into the twentieth century on some fronts. Neither government saw this independence as the cue to take up autonomy in foreign affairs, with both nations largely following England's lead until the fall of Singapore in 1942. Evidence of these deep emotional ties in the general population comes in many forms, from the large number of New Zealanders and Australians volunteering to serve in World War I, through to the fact that the Australian parliament did not formally ratify and pass into effect the 1931 Statute of Westminster (which removed the British parliament's power to legislate for the dominions) until 1942. NZ left it until 1947. Further, until World War II, Australia and NZ operated their embassies from within the British embassy. Arguably, the ultimate link is the British monarch: Queen Elizabeth II is still the formal head of state for both countries.

How British or English were NZ and Australian societies? The vaunted Britishness of NZ has always been precarious, which has arguably influenced some of the boosterism of the past. It was only in the mid-nineteenth century that British settlers outnumbered indigenous Māori. Thus overt displays of “brotherhood” by settlers betrayed a fear that such an identity could easily be diluted by a large indigenous culture, with strong symbols, a unified language, and a fairly unified political movement in the North Island. Despite obvious efforts to strip Māori of their lands and legal rights, they fared comparatively better than other indigenous groups. This was due in large part to their numerical preponderance in much of the country, their strong military traditions, and their cohesiveness and discipline; it had little if anything to do with how “nice” the colonizers were.³³

The story of Britishness is complicated in Australia by the large number of Irish immigrants who have been a feature of Australian immigration since the late eighteenth century. Both countries maintained restrictive policies against Asian immigration, and forms of Asia-skepticism continued well into the 1970s. Australia's White Australia policy, as it was known, operated from 1901 to 1973. NZ did not formally mirror this policy; nonetheless, in practice NZ accepted very few Asian migrants until the 1990s (and, unlike Australia, accepted few Southern Europeans in the immediate post-World War II period).³⁴ Through the mid-1980s, most of NZ's non-white migrants came from the Pacific Islands. The changing immigration patterns in the 1960s and 1970s intersected with shifting perceptions of Asia. As Asian immigration and investment increased rapidly, so did the focus on Asia as the locus of new relationships. This generally occurred first in Australia.

Until the 1940s, white Australians and New Zealanders did *not* see a special relationship between sovereign countries as much as they saw themselves as British and their countries as being part of a larger imperial system, even perhaps a "Greater Britain," a topic on which Duncan Bell lucidly elaborates in Chapter 2 in this volume. This was a qualitatively different sort of special relationship than one later sees, in the case of the USA for example, between sovereign, rational governments seeking to maximize their national self-interest. Thus we are not dealing with either sentimentalism or functionalism but something quite different – the lack of clear sovereign borders between states. As independent nations, NZ and Australia now have a sentimentalist special relationship with Britain. The idea of both countries as continued members of an Anglo-American "club" remains salient. One difference, perhaps, is that pro-monarchical sentiment is lower in Australia than in NZ, as witnessed in the (unsuccessful but fairly popular) push for Australia to become a Republic in the late 1990s.

With the arrival of immigrants from a broader range of nations in the 1970s, Britishness has lost some of its currency as a crucial part of Australian identity.³⁵ Australia has, however, struggled to mold a clear new identity. Part of this is due to a reluctance to break away from Britain as well as a natural skepticism about grand national symbols and expansive political pronouncements about the state of Australia.

The standard narrative about Australian alliance relations is that the Australian government shifted from Britain to America during World War II. The war undoubtedly strengthened Australia's ties with the USA, but it is incorrect to claim that relations with Britain soured. As we indicate in Table 8.2, for most Australians, such relations continued unabated. While there was clear tension between Churchill and Australian prime minister John Curtin over the return of Australian troops from North Africa to defend Australia, both Curtin and his successor Chifley reaffirmed their commitment to Britain time and again.³⁶ Through both the world wars, Australians had seen themselves as "Australian Britons"; it is a similar story in NZ. This support is borne out by the number of military casualties from these conflicts. In World War I military casualties for the UK were around 2.2 percent of the entire population; meanwhile for Australia about 1.4 percent of its entire

population perished; and NZ was even higher at around 1.6 percent. Given the distance and lack of direct threat to the two nations, these figures are astonishing. World War II provides similar comparison – the UK lost close to 1 percent of its population as war casualties; in Australia military deaths accounted for approximately 0.6 percent of the population; and in NZ it was 0.7 percent. Eventually global events rather than a quest for independence pushed Australia and NZ away from this self-identity and interdependence. The key factors were the demise of the British empire, the concomitant rise of the USA, and the movement of the UK towards Europe, culminating with British entry to the EEC in 1973.

The American era

The British special relationship is often described in terms of a mother–child relationship, with Australia and NZ showing dependence, respect, and loyalty in return for economic, cultural, and military benefits. The US relationship with Australia and NZ is seen more as an alliance, or perhaps as a relationship between cousins.³⁷ In this section, we consider the evolution of the ANZUS security relationship but also contextualize it within a much larger intelligence framework.

In 1942, the British surrender in Singapore drew NZ and Australia into a close alliance with the USA. Consequently, 100,000 American troops were stationed in NZ and, by some estimates, up to a million in Australia. Japan had conquered much of East Asia. It was moving into Papua New Guinea and had bombed Darwin in 1942 and 1943, making this alliance grudgingly welcome for functionalist reasons. During the Cold War, the deepening alliance flowered, not because of any sentimentalism in either rhetoric or fact, but because of Australia's and NZ's security concerns and fear of geographical isolation. Where possible, both countries pushed to balance their new and evolving US ties with their traditional anchor: the UK. Australia and NZ signed up to the ANZUS Pact in 1951, as well as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954, and participated in the Five Power Staff Talks in 1955.³⁸ This deepening relationship with the USA did not sit well with many New Zealanders. It is instructive that soon after signing ANZUS, the NZ parliament passed a bill recognizing the British monarch as Queen of NZ. A royal tour was also planned in 1953 to buttress these links to empire.³⁹

In Australia, the push to embrace America was heavily promoted by what Wesley and Warren call the “traditionalists” within foreign policy-making circles,⁴⁰ associated with the sentimentalism of the Liberal Party and Prime Minister Robert Menzies. During the 1950s and 1960s, Australia and NZ hoped to establish a four-member alliance with the USA and the UK. Cabinet discussions and other documents from the time reveal this was a high priority for Menzies and other leading Liberal politicians, as it was for Keith Holyoake's government in NZ. Although a formal alliance that included the UK and the USA was not achieved under Menzies or Holt, Australia did become part of a special “Anglosphere” club (which included the USA, the UK, Canada, and NZ), particularly in intelligence sharing. We feel the word “club” is appropriate, as this group shared similar values

and cultures which led to the larger players (particularly the USA) trusting the smaller players such as Australia and NZ with sensitive intelligence sharing. These smaller players reciprocated by hosting spy bases on their territory, which were critical to America's intelligence network during the Cold War.⁴¹ Again there are emotive or sentimental elements to this relationship that cannot be explained by functionalism alone.

In March 1946, the BRUSA or UKUSA agreement was signed between the USA and UK or "the two partners." Further negotiations brought Australia, NZ, and Canada into the alliance as "second parties" in 1956. The National Security Agency put this in somewhat sentimentalist terms: "These relations evolved and continued across the decades. The bonds, forged in the heat of a world war and tempered by decades of trust and teamwork, remain essential to future intelligence successes."⁴² This high level of trust arguably demonstrates how sentimentalism and functionalism are often inseparable. The history of such close intelligence sharing indicates an extremely high level of trust, as a document released in 2010 outlines: "Such exchange will be unrestricted on all work undertaken ... Except when specifically excluded from the agreement at the request of either party and with the agreement of the other." This, as the principal records specialist at the UK National Archives concludes, "represented a crucial moment in the development of the special relationship between the two wartime allies (the UK and the USA) and captured the spirit and practice of the signals intelligence co-operation which had evolved on an ad-hoc basis during the Second World War."⁴³ Certainly, the so-called "Five Eyes" arrangement became an important staple of Cold War alliance building and continues due to a combination of sentimentalist and functionalist considerations.

NZ's suspension from ANZUS

Until 1985, NZ decision-makers remained committed to ANZUS and subscribed to the "domino theory," sending troops to fight in Vietnam as in Korea.⁴⁴ Overall, NZ expressed common cause with the Americans, maintaining extremely close intelligence and military links. Nevertheless, NZ Foreign Minister Frank Corner observed during the 1970s that New Zealanders were "still old-style British in their instincts." This implied "a certain style of British superciliousness towards Americans and American culture and foreign policies."⁴⁵ The Australian perception of the alliance was in some respects quite similar. Their interest in closer relations with the USA was functionalist; nonetheless, over time, relations grew much closer.

Australia's security relationship with the USA held firm during the 1980s, in contradistinction to NZ, which broke from ANZUS in 1985. The reasons for this break, we suggest, were largely political. However, the foreign policy divergence was not as great as some have alleged. Indeed, NZ's vaunted independence over the nuclear issue obscures the reality that their foreign policies over other matters did not diverge significantly from the USA. Further, the government's economic

policies became far more “American” during the Lange years, and defense cooperation and coordination with Australia actually became closer.

In NZ, perceptions of the USA were broadly positive until the Vietnam War, when large-scale anti-war demonstrations rocked the country.⁴⁶ Australia, too, developed a very strong anti-Vietnam War movement. However, it was not anti-war sentiment that caused the decline in the relationship between NZ and the USA, but rather the issue of a US nuclear warship in a NZ harbor. America tested nuclear weapons in the Marshall Islands until 1962, and in the outback of South Australia and the Gilbert Islands in the 1950s.⁴⁷ The anti-nuclear movement in NZ and Australia also grew in response to French testing in the Pacific. Indeed, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament engaged in organized opposition after France began testing on its island colonies of Mururoa and Fangataufa.⁴⁸ There were secondary effects in terms of NZ–US special relations, and permanent repercussions on the ANZUS alliance.

In the “special relations” of Anglo-American societies, the circulation of ideas across the member nations is an important aspect highlighted by the anti-nuclear movement. In fact, it was US criticism of nuclear weapons that helped fuel the NZ anti-nuclear campaign. Only after a NZ tour by the Harvard University-based Australian physician Helen Caldicott, who screened a documentary made by the National Film Board of Canada, did Labour’s anti-nuclear initiative become enshrined as party policy.⁴⁹ Responding to a high level of public support, in 1984 the Labour Party under David Lange proclaimed a strict anti-nuclear policy, forbidding the docking of ships with nuclear technology or weaponry. This conflicted with the American policy of neither confirming nor denying that its vessels had nuclear technology on board. This anti-nuclear stance helped Labour secure election from a moribund National Party government in 1984.

In February 1985, the “Port Access Dispute” presented a test case for the new policy. The US government made a public request for a navy destroyer, the *USS Buchanan*, to dock at a NZ harbor. Lange was on a tour of the Pacific. His foreign minister was in favor of the ship docking, but his acting prime minister, Geoffrey Palmer, was not, on the grounds that it might have nuclear weapons or power. Lange supported Palmer, and a standoff ensued.⁵⁰ Support for anti-nuclear policies was further galvanized in July 1985 when the French secret service blew up the Greenpeace ship *Rainbow Warrior* in Auckland Harbour, killing a crew member. NZ saw this as an act of war by France, but found little support for this proposition from either the UK or the USA. This incident galvanized support for the anti-nuclear position and led to a further breakdown in public relations with the USA.

The Lange government pressed on with its anti-nuclear legislation, eventually passing the “Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act,” which is still official policy. It was during this period that negotiations broke down, and the USA suspended its treaty obligations under ANZUS.⁵¹ By August 1986, the USA forged stronger bilateral ties with Australia, and NZ–US relations entered into

an “indefinite coma,” a clear example of what one might call “small power idealism.”⁵² In theory, the USA withdrew its obligations to defend NZ in the event of attack. Lange, however, and all other subsequent prime ministers, felt that the USA would indeed come to NZ’s aid if attacked, if only to defend its own security interests.⁵³

Why did NZ take this path? The break had long roots in domestic politics, especially in the aforementioned opposition to French nuclear testing. The period from 1960 to 1984 saw 148 visits by US warships, 13 by nuclear propelled ships. As part of the broader anti-nuclear movement, which primarily targeted France, the USA became seen as part of the problem. A core activist faction within the Labour Party, which included Jim Anderton and Helen Clark, had vocally protested against the Vietnam War and were keen to prohibit nuclear weapons and nuclear power. The decision to ban nuclear ships occurred at a time when the Labour government was riding a wave of popularity and the globally unpopular Reagan administration had created the almost perfect “David and Goliath” set-up. Yet, those who would argue that NZ made a decisive break from the Anglo-American world need to acknowledge a number of ironies, which we elaborate below.

The first irony of the anti-nuclear position is that it was driven not by anger at the Americans, but by objections to French testing of nuclear technology. This fueled the movement that led to the ban on American ships. A second irony concerns Lange’s populist poll-oriented politics. Lange has admitted to little personal interest in the nuclear policy, reiterating in his memoir that he never saw nuclear propulsion as equivalent to nuclear weapons. As he put it, “weapons are made to destroy people and we have to learn to live without them. The rest [nuclear power] may be useful if properly managed.”⁵⁴ Nevertheless, public sentiment against nuclear power was strong, and Lange did not believe NZ would be ejected from ANZUS. Indeed, no NZ prime minister before Lange seriously considered that ANZUS membership would be imperiled by an anti-nuclear stance.

A third irony was Lange’s swing to the right in economic terms. While playing up the nuclear issue as a form of Goliath-bashing, Lange launched his country on a sharp neoliberal course of privatization and a decrease in controls on foreign investment. His government initiated one of the most revolutionary neoliberal reform packages of any western country – spurred on by Finance Minister Roger Douglas.⁵⁵ “Rogernomics” promoted one of the world’s freest and most deregulated regimes, “unmatched internationally, except in former communist bloc countries after 1989.”⁵⁶ This apparent dichotomy was not by accident. Lange was playing to both wings of the party, thus NZ simultaneously developed a nuclear-free policy and one of the most open economies in the OECD.⁵⁷

A fourth irony is that while the NZ public was clearly anti-nuclear, it did not see its anti-nuclear stance as consonant with an anti-ANZUS stance. Polls conducted in 1986 demonstrated a paradox: while 71 percent of the public backed ANZUS, 73 percent also backed NZ as a nuclear-free zone, and 80 percent of

the population wanted to have it both ways: to be nuclear free within ANZUS.⁵⁸ Caution is thus warranted in drawing too much from the policy divergences of the Australian and NZ governments during this period. Both wanted very much to remain part of the ANZUS alliance, and both sought close ties with each other.

A fifth irony is that, seemingly unbeknownst to Lange, NZ's intelligence cooperation with the USA actually increased following the break. Certainly, Lange was punished. US military intelligence was curtailed, but other intelligence continued to flow in. Journalist Nicky Hager puts it that "The United States government wanted other countries to see New Zealand punished for its nuclear-free policies, but the UKUSA alliance was too valuable to be interrupted by politics." The intelligence break was partially a stage show. For example, for a brief period, the "routing indicators," showing the destination and origin of intelligence within UKUSA, were removed from incoming reports. Once the bilateral situation calmed down, they were quietly put back on overseas documents.⁵⁹ A second slap on the wrist was the denial of weekly intelligence summaries formerly provided to NZ under ANZUS; but while the summaries ceased, access to all the intelligence on which they were based continued to flow freely.⁶⁰

The supposed break between NZ and the USA brought an increase in intelligence coordination during this period, largely through the auspices of the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB).⁶¹ Key advisors in the GCSB, more interested in NZ's long-term security interests as part of the western alliance, managed to keep their operations largely in the dark from Lange as well as later prime ministers Geoffrey Palmer and Jim Bolger.⁶² Hager's analysis, supported by Lange – who penned the foreword to his book – suggests that many of the functional aspects of the special relationship continued, despite legislative ignorance and even potential opposition.

NZ's foreign policy turn

Despite the obvious continuation of NZ's ties within the Five Eyes alliance, the anti-nuclear decision changed the orientation of NZ foreign policy over time. The US decision to cut NZ from ANZUS training missions, military cooperation, and intelligence sharing forced NZ to develop a more independent and multilateral approach to its foreign policy. By the 1990s the anti-nuclear position, as well as ambivalence toward ANZUS, were viewpoints accepted by all major parties. NZ became an active player in UN-mandated interventions from Cambodia to Angola and Somalia. In 1992, NZ also became a temporary member of the UN Security Council. Support for the anti-nuclear policy remained relatively constant at 52 percent in 1989 and 54 percent by 1991. Support for a defensive alliance with the USA, by contrast, dropped from 47 percent in 1986 to 39 percent by 1989.⁶³ There is little chance that even a coalition center-right government, as NZ now has, will see fit to reverse Lange's policy. Prime Minister John Key has argued that the stance has become "hard-wired into the New Zealand DNA," a crucial symbol of national identity.⁶⁴

Overall, NZ policymakers have adopted a more publicly responsive foreign policy than has Australia. On matters close to home, like Pacific security, nuclear testing, and relations with Pacific Island neighbors, the government at times defers to public opinion when it is politically expedient to do so. In part, this reflects the small size of NZ and the changing ethnic composition of the country. Foreign Minister Murray McCully describes his country as a “bridge between Asia and Europe,” with national identity as a melding of three identities: “European, Polynesian and Asian.”⁶⁵ In line with this evolving identity is a “tri-polar approach to the world”: a focus on Asia and the Pacific for “reasons of geography,” and a European focus for cultural reasons.⁶⁶ Current demographic trends indicate that the ethnic underpinning of this bridge identity will be accentuated. Based on 2008 projections, NZ’s non-European populations will sustain the highest annual growth rates over the next 20 years to the extent that by 2026, almost half of NZ’s population will be non-European.⁶⁷ When considering the social relationships expressed in Table 8.2, we feel the public will continue to push for NZ engagement with the Pacific.

How much successive governments respond to these demographic changes will be influenced by politics. There is little reason to suggest that NZ decision-makers will pursue a major reorientation of foreign policy, although the pro-Asia rhetoric has become more pronounced in recent years in elite circles. Certainly NZ’s anti-nuclear position and its non-involvement in the Iraq War have created tensions with the USA. However, these should be seen merely as *brotherly* arguments within the Anglo-American family, not as signals of a permanent break in relations. Beneath these occasional spats, the deep (and enduring) trust and connection is best illustrated by the continued closeness of intelligence relations.

Australian public opinion and foreign policy

Australian perceptions of ANZUS have been different: the alliance was embraced in Australia at precisely the same time that NZ policy on nuclear ship visits put that nation’s US alliance at risk. For Australia, the sense of living in a dangerous security environment has made the US alliance seem far more necessary.⁶⁸ History and geographic insecurity have created a security culture, supported by both sides of the political spectrum, in which special relations with Britain and now America are very highly valued. At the same time, due to its larger economy, territorial base, mineral wealth, and larger population, Australia feels less economically vulnerable than NZ. Opinion polls in Australia show high levels of public support for the US–Australia alliance (reinforcing the security culture/special relations argument).⁶⁹ These views have created a situation in which each new prime minister (and most new leaders of the opposition) feel compelled to make a speech affirming support for the US alliance.

For Australia, the strengthening of its US alliance has been its key foreign policy goal, since at least the drafting of ANZUS. Australia’s “American alliance” was

never seen as a temporary solution to such passing threats as international communism or Japanese revanchism. Rather, it has been viewed as a central pillar of Australian security policy. The desire to secure US loyalty largely explains Australia's involvement in Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq, and its strong ongoing commitment to the US-led war in Afghanistan. During the Howard era, Australia moved rhetorically to the heart of the Anglo-American world, while NZ sided with France, Germany, Canada, and other Bush critics. Howard was a traditionalist, an "Anglosphere" booster, and a strong believer in the view held by Menzies that Australia needs "great and powerful friends." Unlike NZ, which under the Labour government of Helen Clark refused to support the war, Australia was an enthusiastic member of the Coalition of the Willing. The official reasons Australia went to war were similar to the arguments presented in the USA and UK – principally to rid Iraq of Weapons of Mass Destruction. However, in Australia, most commentators also saw the decision as being significantly about alliance politics. Further, it could be argued that it was entirely in keeping with what could be called Australia's ongoing Anglospheric "strategic culture."⁷⁰

Security convergence with the USA?

Arguably, assertions about the divergent paths of Australia and NZ can easily be overdone: both countries abide by longstanding multilateralist traditions, which have been pursued very actively at times by leaders within both the Australian Labor Party and the NZ Labour Party. In Australia this involvement in multilateral forums has been balanced (and at times compromised) by a desire to seek close alliances with strong and powerful nations. NZ has also largely adopted this balancing act for much of its history since World War II. The decision to pursue an anti-nuclear policy created a schism in this tradition but, as we have pointed out, no one expected NZ to break with ANZUS – including Lange – and aspects of the NZ-US special relationship continued throughout this period, at times indirectly through the mediating influence of Australia, the UK, and intelligence institutions. A recent US embassy memo prepared for Hillary Clinton's trip to NZ in 2010 makes clear that "New Zealand remained a member of the Five Eyes intelligence community" after 1985, and that "Our intelligence relationship was fully restored in August 29, 2009."⁷¹

Recent events may reduce these differences still further. Under Prime Minister Key and President Obama, the NZ-US relationship has become increasingly cordial. While Bush was roundly unpopular, New Zealanders were very supportive of Obama, who received a 65 percent favorable rating amongst respondents, compared with 11 percent for McCain.⁷² This more open atmosphere may lead to a renewed special relationship. In mid-2010, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell emphasized a "very deliberate effort" by the new administration to develop closer relations with NZ. This includes areas of joint concern like climate change, security in the Pacific, and economic and other opportunities and challenges in Asia. This may also translate into joint military

training exercises and a closer security relationship, although it is unlikely that NZ will join a formal military alliance with the USA.⁷³

Economic relationships

In gauging the evolution of special relationships, economic relationships also merit consideration. As we have already argued, both countries were forced to reorient their trading patterns towards Asia in the 1970s. In this section, we argue that despite closer functional relations with Asian countries, the specialness of the UK and US relationships have changed little over the past three decades.

In both Australia and NZ, we can observe a three-stage process in developing relations with Asia. This evolution is classically presented as first, a narrow xenophobic view of Asia as “alien” and dangerous; second, acceptance and engagement; and finally, third, interdependence. From 1940 to 1960, as was typical for other Anglo-American states, Asia was seen as a homogenous “Other,” with Australia and NZ western-oriented and “unequivocally not part of Asia.” This perception shifted by the 1970s, due to two oil shocks and Britain’s membership in the EEC. Asia now became a regional economic opportunity. From 1968 to 1980, NZ doubled its exports to Asia, with the region becoming almost as big a market for New Zealand as Europe.⁷⁴

Growth in the Asian markets was even more pronounced for Australia, and this continues to be the case. During the third phase of relations from the 1990s, Australia and NZ increasingly saw themselves as interdependent parts of Asia, both economically and, to a degree, strategically. This has since developed into the view that both nations need to be “Asia-literate.”⁷⁵ ASEAN, APEC, and a number of organizations became useful in grouping NZ and Australia with Asian economies to promote a greater degree of interdependence.⁷⁶ It would be easy to believe that Australia has had a more fraught relationship in this period than has NZ, given the history of the White Australia policy and rhetorical exchanges between Australian and Asian leaders. However, both NZ and Australian decision-makers realized that their future prosperity rested significantly on increasing not just exports, but a whole range of economic exchanges such as fee-paying students, business migration, and foreign investment from Asia.

In Australia, there has been a perception that the Labor Party has embraced a pro-Asia stance more than the Conservative parties, which have focused on the Anglo-American alliance. This is true at the rhetorical level; the Keating Labor government backed up its talk by being a key player in the establishment of APEC and signing a security treaty with Indonesia in 1995. Although the Howard government rhetorically pulled back from this engagement and talked up its desire to “reinvigorate” the Australia–US alliance, the reality is that both major parties in Australia wanted to, and largely have, increased integration into Asian markets while maintaining a strong security alliance with the USA.

NZ would arguably have taken a similar approach if it had still been an active member of ANZUS. However, rhetorically cast out of a close alliance by the USA,

it became more adventurous in its foreign policy. This has made it more creative in its policy approach to China and led to its unprecedented free trade agreement with the PRC. However, the NZ tendency to oversell the significance and uniqueness of its achievements, and to highlight differences with Australia, means that any analysis should proceed with caution. For example, the NZ–China FTA could be less about NZ ingenuity than it is about China’s desire to send a message to Australia and other pro–China FTA trading partners.

Bilateralism: Australia and New Zealand

In this section, we focus on the relationship between Australia and NZ. Anglosphere theorist James Bennett observes that the Anglo–American world contains many double acts: “Britain and Ireland, the U.S. and Canada, and Australia and New Zealand.” He notes an obvious fact remarked upon by Seymour Lipset and others: “In each, the smaller partner has found close trade relations and some aspects of union with the larger partner to be desirable but also has harbored resentments and concerns about being swallowed and assimilated by its larger partner.”⁷⁷ This mixture of cooperation, resentment, and concern characterizes NZ perceptions of Australia. In psycho–sociological terms, New Zealanders often resent being ignored by the Australian press and Australians in general, especially given that New Zealanders tend to be much more knowledgeable and familiar with Australia. In Freudian terms, this is a classic case of the narcissism of minor differences playing out in bilateral relations. This makes sense when one considers the history of these two countries. In the nineteenth century it was assumed that NZ would eventually merge with the Australian colonies, which were as different from one another as NZ was from them. Indeed, the 1900 Australian constitution provides for NZ to join the Australian commonwealth at any time upon application.⁷⁸

In this context we need to understand claims that the two countries are polar opposites. Devetak and True, for example, see them sitting on opposing ends of a spectrum, with NZ’s identity as: “an independent and principled player on the world stage, whereas Australia’s is asserted most strongly through its self–image as a regional great power and close ally of the United States, and its decidedly realist, sometimes unprincipled, foreign policy.”⁷⁹ Australian defense expert Hugh White contends: “But Australians need to realise that our trans–Tasman cousins do see the world differently from us. Australians are from Mars, Kiwis are from Venus.”⁸⁰ Devetak and True overstate matters, but their first point does highlight a common self–perception held by New Zealanders, while the second is the view of many critics of Australian foreign policy.

More sensibly, if one looks at the relative size of NZ and Australia and their geographical locations, it is hardly surprising that their foreign policy priorities have differed in recent years. In truth, these differences have come from the same catalysts for both nations: a growing independence in thinking and less attachment to Britain from the 1970s onward, and a greater move towards Asia in matters of

trade and regional cooperation. It would be incorrect to argue that the “Port Access Dispute” entirely defines NZ’s relationship with the USA. As we have discussed, intelligence networking and coordination actually increased during the 1980s and 1990s (including NZ’s entry into the ECHELON surveillance project), and NZ’s break with ANZUS was mired in a number of ironies which suggest that events did not have to transpire as they did, and were not as narrowly “path dependent” as subsequent political commentators have suggested.

Indeed, many similarities characterize the self-identity and world outlook of both countries. The enduring (and increased) importance of the ANZAC tradition in Australia and NZ highlights the ongoing power of militarism and mythology. Australian commentators have frequently claimed that the increased importance accorded to the ANZAC national memorial day in the last decade was in part the result of efforts by the Howard government to boost militarism in Australian life. Such claims, however, fail to account for the rise of similar sentiments in NZ, amongst both Labour and National supporters. Reflecting something deeper than the political manipulations of symbols in the cultures of both societies, the memory of the World War I battle at Gallipoli evokes powerful emotions that straddle the Tasman and point to the strong influence of military history. Australia and NZ offered incredible loyalty to Britain during both world wars, but the nations’ experiences of war are often described as the founding points in developing their own independent national character.

In terms of bilateral arrangements, the 1944 Australian–New Zealand Agreement or Canberra Pact was signed to create a separate sphere of influence over the southwest and South Pacific. It also paved the way for regular meetings between Canberra and Wellington, for common planning in defense, external relations, industry, and commercial policy, even social programs.⁸¹ Australia and NZ later set up a Consultative Committee on Defence Co-operation in 1977. NZ followed this a year later in its *Defence Review* by seeing the two countries as a “single strategic entity.”⁸² And, as we have already discussed, relations continued to strengthen as NZ and Australia became members of the Five Eyes and participated in ECHELON.

Ironically, while Australian leaders took exception to Lange’s posturing during the 1980s, relations with Australia became closer. This was due in part to Bob Hawke’s fear that if a strong bilateral relationship was not maintained, NZ might fall out of the western orbit.⁸³ Certainly NZ seemed to follow suit on many Australian decisions thereafter. For example, NZ followed Australia in creating a Defence Electronic Warfare Data Base (DEWDAB), even adopting the same name. Both countries also coordinated an increase in the deployment of specialized SAS personnel for intelligence missions, shared research in towed arrays for anti-submarine surveillance, and converged on many aspects of “signals intelligence interception and analysis.”⁸⁴ There was also the adoption of the Close Economic Relations (CER) agreement in 1983, which created something akin to the EEC in Australasia.

Until the Clark Labour government in 1999, Australia and NZ still maintained that they were a “single strategic entity,” meaning that an attack against one would

pose a security risk against the other, thus necessitating collective action. By 2000, the term was dropped. While the phrase did not indicate any sort of joint foreign policies, the Clark government felt it impeded the assertion of an independent foreign policy.⁸⁵ Nevertheless, the two countries cooperate on defense matters. During the conflict in East Timor, NZ and Australia formed the bulk of the UN-mandated UNIFET force sent there in 1999.⁸⁶ Both countries worked together to achieve a peace settlement in Bougainville and responded in a coordinated manner after George Speight overthrew Fiji's first Indian prime minister in a 2000 coup, jointly imposing "smart sanctions" on the coup leaders. Both countries have also been instrumental in making RAMSI peace-building initiatives effective in the Solomon Islands.⁸⁷

The most recent indication of NZ's intentions come from the National government's 2010 White Paper, which puts the Anglo-American alliance into perspective. It highlights historical ties, but also alludes to potential divergence in the future. Regarding the past, the other four members of the Anglo-American world are described as being part of "longstanding and close security partnerships," which are in turn "grounded in common traditions, experiences, and values" and "maintained and strengthened by dialogue, personnel exchanges, training, exercises, technology transfer, intelligence sharing, and the application of military doctrine." These relationships are presented as being at the core of the NZ defense strategy.⁸⁸ The differences in perception as well as size will continue to have an effect on the relationship. The White Paper is clear that "Australia will remain New Zealand's most important security partner," but while there is a search for common interest, divergence will become more obvious in the future because NZ's defense budget is small, while "Australia continues to invest more heavily in high-end military capabilities."⁸⁹

In outlining the NZ–Australia special relationship, the idea of a bridge identity between Asia and Europe is common. Both see themselves as having a common heritage, common democratic norms, common security interests in the Pacific, and common economic interests in trading with each other, with Europe, and, most importantly, with Asia. For all of the rivalry between the two nations (much of it relating to sports), there is significant affection and cooperation. They afford each other's citizens special treatment from immigration through to welfare, education, and generous health benefits.

A key difference, again tied to domestic politics and state attributes, concerns the importance of domestic identity politics to each case. In NZ, small size, historical vulnerability in economic terms, and a sense of a benign security environment have all contributed to its porosity in terms of trade, migration, and new ideas. Australia provides a puzzling mix of a far more multi-ethnic society. More open immigration policies to South Europeans in the post-World War II period, and the entry of a diverse range of migrants since the early 1970s, have led to many migrant success stories and a good deal of integration. Still, many Australians have struggled to shed traditional Anglo-Celtic understandings of who they are as a people. Politicians have zeroed in on this concern in their

federal politics rhetoric. The populist debate over the supposed “flood” (in actuality a tiny proportion of the total immigrants to the country) of illegal refugees arriving by boat is a case in point. Their subsequent treatment in detention centers reflects the policy outcomes of this tension. Nonetheless, Australia’s substantial annual intake of migrants from around the world asks Australians to integrate with new peoples every year. They largely do, but the impact in the medium- to longer term of shifting demographics on Australian foreign policy is difficult to judge.

At present, a more obvious conclusion is that politicians are still most comfortable taking a traditional approach to alliance relations (in other words, embedding security relations with the Anglo-American world). Immigration has undoubtedly had a noticeable impact on NZ in the last two decades and has led to the development of a tripolar identity forged amongst the mix of Europeans, Polynesians, and Asians. At this stage, the Asian dimension is more rhetorical than deeply felt, but it builds on a foundation of biculturalism that has long rejected open ideas of multicultural citizenship. Both countries face a chasm between the elite’s discourse on integrating migrants and popular “shock jock” announcements, which are frequently xenophobic. NZ’s recent touting of its tripolar identity and how this might allow “special relations” with China is not that different from rhetoric used in the 1990s by the Keating government towards Asian economic integration. Another example is provided by the claim that the Chinese-language ability of former Australian prime minister Kevin Rudd would create closer relations between China and Australia. Ultimately these predictions of closer ties are functional. Relations with Asia are not cemented nearly as strongly as the sentimental ties NZ and Australia enjoy with each other and with the wider Anglo-American world.

Australia and New Zealand: torn and tripolar Identities?

Samuel Huntington sharpened Australia’s evolving post-Anglo identity to the furthest extreme when he called Australia a “torn country” pulled between its traditional position as part of “European civilization” and its desire to become part of “Asian civilization.”⁹⁰ For a number of reasons his claim rings untrue. All Australian elites wanted greater entry into Asian markets and Asian regional institutions. But they were divided on whether this meant distancing Australia from its British heritage. And no significant political leader talked about making Australia part of Asian civilization. As for public opinion, it was firmly against the notion. Lastly, Asian leaders were not particularly supportive of Australia joining regional forums and certainly did not see Australia as Asian. Describing Australia in the 1990s as anywhere close to a “torn” country – caught between the East and the West – was thus a serious misreading of the politics and policies that simultaneously sought more independence from Britain and more opportunities in Asia.

Blame for the confusion and misunderstanding can be laid at the feet of the at times hyperbolic debates over Australia’s future as a Republic and over

immigration levels from Asia. The key figures in these debates were prime ministers Keating and Howard, and an independent Member of Parliament from Queensland, Pauline Hanson. The Labor Prime Minister Paul Keating set off both the push for greater Australian economic and political integration into Asia and the call for Australia to become a Republic. His rhetoric on a range of issues was often colorful and blunt: he regularly chided Conservatives for being too closely wedded to Britain and the USA, lacking sufficient pride in Australian achievements or the courage to pursue a more independent and forward-looking foreign policy that was open to new opportunities.⁹¹ Even though he pursued a policy cultivating a close alliance with the USA once he came into office in 1996, Prime Minister Howard disagreed strongly with Huntington's claims about Australia. But he blamed Keating for having left himself open to misunderstandings, and saw the entire episode as the unfortunate by-product of a foolish and needlessly introspective debate about Australian identity and foreign policy.⁹²

A lightning rod for this stormy debate was Pauline Hanson, who was elected to Parliament in 1996 and subsequently made her One Nation Party a force in Australian politics. Hanson opposed Asian immigration and what she saw as the breakdown of Anglo-Australia. Although she received limited support, through the use of exaggeration and the stoking of moral panic she gained enough publicity for her name and arguments to become well known, not only across Australia but also with Asian neighbors. John Howard sought to distance himself from both Keating's Asian engagement and Hanson's anti-Asian rhetoric, but he conveyed clearly that he understood the concerns of Hanson supporters and has often been accused of courting One Nation voters with his very tough policies on refugees.⁹³ Australia's struggle for a foreign policy vision and identity has been ongoing ever since British entry into the European Common Market in 1972. Former Malaysian leader Dr. Mahathir once jibed that, "When the British were rich, Australia wanted to be British. When the Americans were rich, Australia wanted to be American. Now that Asia is rich, Australia wants to be Asian."⁹⁴ Since the 1980s Australia's foreign policy shows the continuing pull of Anglo-American sentimentalism. Seen positively, since the late 1980s Australia has fashioned a pragmatic multicultural policy at home that breaks with its racist past and facilitates the growing importance of Asian markets and influence in Australia. Seen negatively, Australia has thought too little about developing a new approach to foreign affairs. Instead, it has instrumentally traded with Asia while neglecting to learn much about Asian societies and cultures. Although neither interpretation comes close to a definition of Australia as a "torn country," what exactly Australia's foreign policy identity is remains significantly unknown, even to itself.

New Zealand illustrates with even greater clarity such a domestic reorientation. Demographic trends illustrate important shifts in New Zealand's ethnic composition and identity politics. Chinese had been considered "friendly aliens" who could be naturalized as British subjects, but policy changed in 1908 and Chinese immigration virtually ground to a halt. Well into the 1950s there existed a highly restrictive quota system targeting Asian immigrants.⁹⁵ The changing immigration patterns

in the 1960s and 1970s intersected with more open perceptions of Asia, as policy-makers moved from outright hostility to the pursuit of interdependence.⁹⁶ Over time, New Zealanders saw themselves less as British and more as something distinct. This is not to deny that the relationship between New Zealand remained close. But with the non-European population growing rapidly, a new kind of mix between the declining Anglo and the growing Māori, Pacific Islanders, and Asian populations will give non-Europeans a majority in a few decades' time.⁹⁷ Even more than Australia, New Zealand is forging ahead into a tricultural future.

That future has roots reaching back into New Zealand's past. The 1840 Treaty of Waitangi is the country's founding document. It provides the basis of an enduring myth of equality between Māori and white New Zealanders. In return for loyalty to the British Crown, Māori were to receive sovereignty over their lands and resources, and legal protection.⁹⁸ Currently, Māori have their own political parties (the Māori Party), widespread influence in other parties through the mixed member proportional representation (MMP) system, a national television station, and funding for Māori culture and tradition. The Māori language is an official language. Although ethnic relations are far from ideal, New Zealand's track record compares quite favorably with that of other western settler societies.

In the future, Asian influence will surely grow and further transform New Zealand's society. In fact, China sees itself as having a special relationship with New Zealand and promotes the idea of the "four firsts" in New Zealand's diplomacy: recognition of the PRC in December 1972, the first western country to sign a bilateral agreement with China after it joined the WTO in August 1997, the first western country to recognize China as a market economy in April 2004, and the first developed country to pursue free trade negotiations with China, a process announced in November 2004.⁹⁹ New Zealand's relations with China and Asia epitomize an evolution in its identity expressed in terms of emotional beliefs, from a fairly narrow and at times xenophobic outlook, to acceptance and engagement, followed by a hopeful interdependence. Sharp increases in Asian immigration are continuing to make the Asian population a larger part of New Zealand society. New Zealand's foreign policy will continue to be shaped by its emerging tricultural identity.

Conclusion

Understanding the importance Australian and NZ leaders and the general public attach to special relationships helps clarify some enduring elements of the foreign policy of both countries, in particular towards the USA and UK. We conclude with several points. First, the special relationship *primus inter pares* has been with Britain. This relationship with NZ and Australia was not at first a relationship between states, between equally sovereign entities. To a certain extent, Watson and Bull's work on "world society" helps us to understand some of the shared values and beliefs that allowed an imperial center and a collection of colonies, and later dominions, to exist in a closely interconnected web of cultural, economic,

and military relationships. The solidarist view, which sees sovereignty as less important than shared norms and forms of cooperation, also slots well into our work on special relationships. Similarly, constructivist observations about norms help us to understand how former colonies in NZ and Australia retained their special relationships to the UK as they evolved into dominions and then, eventually, sovereign states.¹⁰⁰ At the level of popular opinion, ties to the UK remain very salient.

Second, for both cases, the US special relationship began as primarily functionalist, but developed sentimentalist overtones with time. These stemmed from the very real benefits the US alliance brought to western countries in the Asia-Pacific after 1942. These benefits continued during the Cold War. Both NZ and Australia had a tendency to play off one special relationship against another, choosing the UK over the USA or vice versa, depending on the time period and political event. NZ has been more prone to this than Australia, especially in cultural terms, where most things British are still perceived as being superior. The level of functionalism in the US–Australian special relationship has changed little with time, while levels of sentimentalism tend to vary. In both cases, the specialness of the US relationship exists primarily at an elite level.

Third, the evolving relationships with Asian countries, particularly China, offer some fascinating contrasts. For both countries, China offers the possibility of a special economic relationship rooted in very close trading ties and a level of economic interdependence that will rival the US–Canada, NZ–Australia, or UK–Australia–NZ trade relationships before the 1970s. These ties will continue to be functionalist for the foreseeable future, although a rhetoric of sentimentalism is evolving, at least in NZ. Again, as with the USA, such ties are primarily between political and economic elites, rather than the general population.

Fourth, the relationship between Australia and NZ is extremely close: probably the closest of all in the Anglo-American grouping. While there are obvious differences, it is easy to downplay the enduring history of cooperation between these two longstanding allies and friends. Critics tend to underemphasize the continued circulation of immigrants, tourists, businesspeople, conference attendees, and students from one Anglo-American society to the other. New Zealand's single most popular destination for resettlement is Australia.

Finally, both countries, at both elite and society levels, remain closely tied to the larger Anglo-American world. Tourism to Canada and the UK remains high amongst New Zealanders and Australians. For all of their changing trading relations and new immigrants, Australia and NZ remain, at least into the medium term, firmly part of the Anglo-American "civilization" as it changes and evolves in the new century. This will continue to be the case because most politicians and senior foreign policy bureaucrats, and much of the public, see both countries as part of an Anglo-American club. At the everyday level, this ideational power is supported by the fact that most television shows, films, popular music, magazines, newspaper and media stories in NZ and Australia are from the Anglo-American world.

In alliance and security relations, this clubbishness has led to the two nations seeking close relations with the UK for much of their histories, later turning to the USA. This new relationship has been less sentimental and more based on elite connections, but clubbish nonetheless, particularly in the area of intelligence sharing, an activity whose daily cable rewards make senior politicians and their staffers in Australia (and even NZ) complicit in, and often addicted to, American power. Anti-nuclear policy was undoubtedly a challenge for the NZ relationship. It caused tensions and led to more a multilateral instinct in NZ than Australia but, as we opined earlier, these are best seen as disputes within a family, a view which pertains both at state and society levels. There seems little to indicate that the alliance is in danger of receding. Indeed, the opposite is arguably the case, and as trade and security relationships become more interconnected and interdependent, we expect the ties between Anglo-American states to retain an enduring appeal, in both functionalist and sentimentalist terms.

Notes

- 1 Our thanks to Peter Katzenstein for creating this fascinating project and including us as part of it. We appreciate his patience, kindness, and mentorship throughout. We have also benefited from the comments of numerous contributors to this volume, especially Herman Schwartz, Audie Klotz, Brian Bow, Arturo Santa-Cruz, and Srdjan Vucetic. Thank you also to Todd Hall and Rose McDermott.
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- 4 Keohane and Nye 1977.
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- 6 Wight 1986, 123.
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- 8 Schoenbaum 1998, 273.
- 9 Dumbrell and Schäfer 2009a, 4.
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- 11 Gamble and Kearns 2007, 116.
- 12 Dumbrell 2006, 14–15.
- 13 Danchev 2005, 435–6.
- 14 Watt 1986, 1.
- 15 Smith 1990.
- 16 Reynolds 1989, 95–6.
- 17 Dumbrell 2006, 14–15.
- 18 For an overview, see MacDonald and O'Connor 2010.
- 19 McDermott 2010, 114.
- 20 Finnemore 1996, 22.
- 21 Obama and Cameron 2011.
- 22 Bull and Watson 1984, 330; Buzan 1993, 327–52.
- 23 See, for example, Wheeler 2001.
- 24 MacDonald and O'Connor 2010.
- 25 Champion 2010, 30–3.
- 26 Crawford 2000, 134–5.
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- 28 Bleiker and Hutchison 2007, 4–5.
- 29 New Zealand Cabinet Office 2010, 3.
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- 31 Zemka 2002, 446–7.
- 32 Webster 2006, 656–7.
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- 36 Curran 2011.
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- 38 McIntyre 1993, 45.
- 39 Miller 1987, 383.
- 40 Wesley and Warren 2000.
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- 54 Lange 2005, 33; Hawke 2011.
- 55 Smith 2005, 211.
- 56 Edwards 2001, 186.
- 57 Hawke 2011.
- 58 Smith 2005, 223.
- 59 Hager 2007, 23–4.
- 60 *Ibid.*, 211.
- 61 *Ibid.*, 19–20.
- 62 *Ibid.*, 220.
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- 64 Key 2007.
- 65 McCully 2009a.
- 66 McCully 2009b.
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- 68 Renouf 1979; Burke 2008.
- 69 Jackman 2008; Jackman and Vavreck 2011.
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- 75 Hartdegen 1999, 5, 19–20.
- 76 McLean 2003, 196–7.
- 77 Bennett 2007b, 57.
- 78 Palmer and Hill 2002, 315.
- 79 Devetak and True 2006, 243.
- 80 White 2005.
- 81 McIntyre 1993, 41–2; McLean 2003, 132–3, 140.
- 82 Hoadley 2000.
- 83 Harland 1992, 61.
- 84 Hager 2007, 180.
- 85 McMillan 2008, 194.

- 86 McLean 2003, 260–6.
- 87 MacDonald 2005, 171–92.
- 88 New Zealand Ministry of Defence 2010, 18.
- 89 *Ibid.*, 28.
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- 94 Wesley 2007.
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- 96 Hartdegen 1999, 5; 19–20.
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- 100 Beeson 2009, 78–9.